Maria Gianniou, EKEM/EuroMedO
July 2010

“Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries…on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”
European Security Strategy, December 2003

When the European Security Strategy was published in 2003, the ring of friends that the European Union aspired to secure in the Mediterranean region was incomplete: Europe had contractual relations with all of its Mediterranean neighbours except Libya.

A country with a population of approximately six million people, Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa (followed by Nigeria and Algeria), while its vast majority of oil exports are sold to European countries ¹. For almost two decades, the country was marginalised and isolated from the international community, mainly because of its on-going nuclear programme and of the authorities’ refusal to surrender the Libyans involved in the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am flight 103 and in the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772. This stance led to the adoption, on March 1992,  of Security Council Resolution 748 and the subsequent imposition of civil aviation, trade and arms embargoes.

Yet, in 2003, the authorities agreed to disclose and dismantle their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes and to take some responsibility for the bombings, paying almost 3 billion US dollars in compensation to the families of the two flights. These undertakings marked the beginning of a long process aiming at the full reintegration of the country into the international community.

The EU’s Engagement with  Libya : the issue of illegal immigration

As expressed by EU diplomats, “in recognition of the major efforts accomplished by this country”², particularly during 2003, Europe decided that it was time for the EU and Libya to move towards increased interaction and to resume intense political contacts with the country. As a consequence, the Council agreed, on October 2004, to embark upon a “policy of engagement” with Libya³.

But, what was the objective of this new initiative and how was it going to be expressed on the ground? The EU’s intentions were, from the beginning, straightforward: European leaders needed a partner in order to tackle illegal immigration issues. Libya, because of Gaddafi’s⁴ pro-african policy encouraging the free movement of persons and capitals, became, first, a country of destination for migrant labour and, soon after, a country of transit towards the European shores⁵. Combatting illegal immigration was immediately considered, inter alia, as an issue of mutual interest. Indeed, even before the Council agreement of 2004, the need for the integration of immigration into the Union’s relations with third countries was highlighted by the European Council of Seville, in June 2002. Later on, in November 2002, the EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs underlined that an enhanced cooperation with third countries would help them “to fulfil their roles in the international endeavours to deal with the many-faceed problems caused by illegal migration”⁶. At this end, they considered it essential to initiate cooperation with Libya on this matter.

The 2004 policy of engagement with Libya envisaged the dispatch of a technical mission to Libya in order to examine arrangements for combating illegal immigration. At the same time, the Council decided to revoke all restrictive measures adopted by the EU in application of the UNSC resolutions, to lift the arms embargo, to implement an act of solidarity with those infected with HIV at Benghazi hospital⁷ and to follow closely the human rights situation in the country. The overall objective of Europe’s engagement towards Libya was its full integration into the Barcelona Process⁸.

A year later, in June 2005, the Council of the EU adopted a concrete orientation towards co-operation with Libya in the field of illegal immigration initiating an ad hoc dialogue on migration issues with the country, while stressing at the same time that the extent and development of such a cooperation will depend on Libya's commitments on asylum and fundamental rights⁹.

In the field of health, an Action Plan for the Benghazi Hospital was decided in 2004 and implemented in close collaboration with the Gaddafi Foundation and the Libyan Government. In this framework, EU-funded technical medical assistance has been provided to the Benghazi hospital with a view to ensure an appropriate medical care to HIV-infected patients in Benghazi. The project was implemented in four phases, from 2004 to 2007, with an overall budget of 2,6 million euros¹⁰.

Enhancing relations: negotiating a Framework Agreement

Concerning energy, Libya is Europe’s third largest supplier behind Norway and Russia, covering 6.9% of total EU imports of energy, amounting to € 23.6 billion in 2006. At the same time, the EU is the first trading partner for Libya, covering almost 70% of its total trade that amounted approximately to € 26.4 billion in 2009¹¹. These figures attest strong and interdependent trade relations between the two parties and necessitate the establishement of a bilateral legal framework which would not only allow the two to intensify the cooperation on trade and economic issues, but also to enhance dialogue on issues of further common interest.

This was acknowledged by the EU in 2007, when the Council proposed to open discussions on an EU-Libya framework agreement and invited the Commission to present draft negotiating directives to this effect “according to the fundamental principles inspiring the foreign policy of the European Union”¹².

Indeed, some months later, in February 2008, the EU Commission proposed a negotiating mandate for a Framework Agreement with Libya. The aim was to establish a fruitful dialogue and cooperation on political issues of common interest; to contribute to the economic and social reforms being undertaken in the country; to further develop trade and economic relations, notably by establishing a FTA; and to cooperate in many areas of common interest such as migration, energy, transport, education, environment and culture¹³. As a consequence, the Commission’s negotiations mandate was adopted on 24 July 2008 and the negotiations officialy started on November 2008.

The seventh round of negotiations on the EU-Libya partnership accord began on 8 June 2010 in Tripoli. For almost two years, Europe and Libya have been negotiating on the future bilateral agreement that will establish a clear-cut framework governing their enhanced relations. Although Libya does not benefit form the ENPI instrument, a strategy paper and a national indicative programme for the period 2011-2013 has already been prepared by the Commission. It clearly states that the overarching objective of the EC strategy towrds Libya focuses on three major axes: it aims to consolidate the country’s integration in the rules-based international political and economic system; to ensure the successful implementation of the Framework Agreement under negotiation and to jointly tackle common challenges by supporting Libya’s modernisation¹⁴.

The Commission’s negotiating mandate became a reality only after Libya began to emerge from its pariah status in 2003. Since then, the country has entered a process of relative “normalisation” with the Western world. In December 2007, Gaddafi paid a state visit to the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy¹⁵, for the first time in 34 years, while on July 2008 the two countries signed an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of civil uses of nuclear power¹⁶. At the same time, Libya has restored full diplomatic relations with the US in 2008 while enhancing its cooperation with other EU contries such as Germany¹⁷, Greece¹⁸, but, most of all Italy. In August 2008, Italy signed a “Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation” with Libya¹⁹. As part of the agreement, Italy promised to compensate Libya for its occupation of the country between 1911 and 1943. The agreement involved a package of 5 billion US dollars for construction projects, student grants and pensions for Libyan soldiers who served with Italian forces during World War II. In return, Libya agreed, among other things, to tighten control of its territorial waters and accept disembarkation on its soil of individuals intercepted at sea by Italian vessels²⁰.

The way ahead: challenges and prospects

The EU aspires to conclude an Agreement with Libya by the end of 2010. Yet, even though the negotiations are progressing, some hurdles still exist. In fact, one of the major issues that the authorities have to tackle is the issue of illegal immigration. The subject is of the utmost importance for the EU and Libya is well aware of it. Indeed, the country’s authorities could use the thorny issue of illegal immigration as a means to secure modern military equipment and training. Last year, Libya sent  Brussels its “shopping list” asking for 1 billion US dollars (€ 707 million) worth of technical assistance and equipment in exchange for more collaboration with Europe on the illegal immigration front²¹. The Libyan government is conscious of the diplomatic advantage it has vis-à-vis Europe as far as it concerns the migration issue. For this reason, the Libyan authorites do not hesitate to show their discontent: “there are 6 million Libyans and we have 2 million illegal immigrants, this problem is really on the shoulders of the Libyan people…We are working as guards to the EU, and Libya might not be able to continue doing this” warned the Libyan foreign secretary Mussa Kussa in Malta, in January 2010²². A couple of months ago, in May 2010, the Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdelati Al-Obeidi, during a meeting with the Italian Parliament’s Schengen-Europol and Immigration Committee, led by Margherita Boniver, said that the EU was supposed to have invested in a sophisticated border monitoring system, which included satellite and air surveillance. Funding was to be provided by Italy and partly by the EU. Although Italy had done its part, the EU had not²³.

Yet, although the EU clearly demonstrates its eagerness to cooperate with Libya on the issue of migration²⁴, it hesitates with regard to the degree of commitment. Even though the European Council, in June 2009²⁵, has included Libya in its list of countries of origin and transit in the Mediterranean Sea, with which an increased cooperation is to be established on migration issues, and although new cooperation projects were proposed in 2009, “because Libya requested a very substantial political, technical and financial commitment from the EU to tackle the migration phenomenon, it has so far not been possible to agree on an EC contribution”²⁶.

Directly linked to the migration issue, is the chapter of human rights. Libya has been accused for its dire record on the human rights issue and for not being a party to the UN 1951 Refugee Convention. This means that the country does not recognise the need for people to receive international protection. This is a rather thorny issue with which EU leaders must cope. The respect for human rights is one of Europe’s top foreign policy priorities. Will Europe be able to find a balance between the issue of illegal immigration and human rights abuses? Is there a limit that has to be defined in advance? Will the EU-Libya negotiations depend on the country’s willingness to comply with EU principles and values? Will the EU turn a blind eye to the country’s record?

The recent round of negotiations has revealed that the human rights issue still remains high on the agenda and causes much frustration, even though Libya has agreed to the setting up of a dialogue on human rights. Indeed, it is very dificult to obtain an agreement with the Libyan authorities with a reference to the powers of the International Criminal Court or a clause making reference to the “Rome Statute”²⁷. Furthermore, in the beginning of June 2010, the government expelled the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. It was reported²⁸ that Libya’s Foreign Ministry considers the UNHCR presence within Libya to be illegal since Libya is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention.

The EU should not overloook these facts. The lack of effective Libyan structures that would be able to deal with asylum and refugee issues combined with a high influx of illegal immigrants and with the already existing agreement between Italy and Libya, should urge the European authorities to pay particular attention to the development of a transparent, international law-abiding and effective local administration system.

The issue of illegal immigration is of particular importance now that the EU is setting up its “new” foreign policy system. Certainly, the European External Action Service will aim to promote the respect for human rights and democracy in its relations with Europe’s partners. The importance that the EU seems to be placing in its cooperation with Libya, in relation to the migration issue, is evident: on June 2010 the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, whose country held the presidency of the EU for the first half of 2010, payed a state visit to Tripoli and met with Gaddafi. Both leaders discussed the preparations under way to hold the EU-Africa summit in Libya in October which aims to bring an end to illegal immigration²⁹.

At the same time, in its recent Resolution of June 2010, the European Parliament urged the Libyan authorities to ratify the Geneva Convention on Refugees without delay and to allow and facilitate the running of UNHCR’s activities in Libya, including the establishment of a national asylum system. It also affirmed that any cooperation or agreement between the EU and Libya must be conditional on the ratification and implementation by Libya of the Geneva Convention on Refugees and of other major human right conventions and protocols³⁰.

Libya, a country that has been isolated for too long, is perhaps making its comeback to the international community. The EU, anxious to tackle the issue of illegal immigration, offers Libya a unique opportunity to fulfill its aspirations and to become a fully fledged member of the global system. If the EU is to play a crucial role in international affairs, both as a commercial but also as a normative power, it has to treat Libya as any other EU partner country: double standards should never be used as a means to tackle foreing policy issues no matter how urgent they can be.