|
By Mersilia Anastasiadou
The European Union will delay for as long as it can a clear-cut commitment to open its doors to Turkey .
Introduction:
Germany and France had principal institutional objections regarding Turkey’s accession into the European Union, on the grounds that any country interested in joining the E.U. should unconditionally harmonize with E.U. values and principles and the acquis communautaire, effectively uphold fundamental principles, such as the rule of law, democracy, respect of international humanitarian law, the human rights declarations, minority rights, political asylum rights and civil liberties.
Democratic political stability and financial restructuring, the modernization of public administration and regulation of social and economic competition policies, constitute additional basic requirements. These are generally regarded among EU institutions and member states to constitute the foundations of democratic and sound political institutions and of a competitively functioning free market economy and as such, determined the institutional framework, of French and German objections, requirements or conditions to Turkey’s EU accession.
Another key issue whose significance can hardly be exaggerated, and one of grave concern, mainly for Germany and France but also for other EU member-states, is demography: the high rate of population growth in Turkey and the mass migration movement of the Turkish labour force, and its implications for the future national identity of individual E.U. countries, as well as for the internal EU political balance and decision-making process.
The former Socialist (Socialdemocratic) German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, depicted these concerns in his book “Germany after the Cold War and Europe”, stressing that they are embedded in Franco-German political culture. Regarding the first issue of the rapid Turkish population growth, he maintains that it is or could soon become “threatening” to EU national and community balances. Simply put, Turkey is not any accession state candidate, but one which could become the largest state within the E.U. In 2050, Turkey will probably have twice the population of Germany and France combined.
As a result, the voting power (that is based on the member country’s population) of Turkey in various E.U. institutions, like the European Parliament, will be substantially larger than that of Germany and France, and thus, Turkey will be able to greatly influence and in some cases control or determine, the decision making mechanisms of the E.U.. Currently Germany and France are the countries with the greater voting power within the EU.
The second substantial fear of the German and French elites and indeed the public at large, concerns the crucial issue of free movement of workers and other social groups between E.U. members. If Turkey joins the E.U., millions more of Turkish workers would be able to freely move into European cities. Free movement of labour is a defining characteristic of integration, an EU right and privilege from which no member country could be excluded from, via national and permanent derogations.
However, given the sheer size of Turkey, according to some EU officials , the right of free movement for Turkish citizens could pose major additional problems for the national identity and social and cultural cohesion of EU member states, something that is outright undesirable to both their governments and public opinion.
The last concern of Germany and France concerns the relationship between Turkish civilization and European civilization? Could Islam become a pillar of European culture? Can the Ottoman heritage, be reconciled and integrated in European affairs? These are fundamental and difficult questions on European identity and future, which cannot be easily brushed aside with simplistic stereotypes and anything but problem-free ideological schemas of “multiculturalism”, and which, consequently, continue to cause concern and controversy among politicians and intellectuals of practically the entire ideological spectrum all around Europe.
Equally crucial to Turkey’s bid to join the EU, are the attitudes and policies of Greece (and, since its 2004 accession, of Cyprus too) . Analyses of the position of Greece, often distinguish its strategic from its tactical aspects and point out that it was primarily on the tactical level that this position evolved in two broadly distinguishable periods or phases.
During the first period of EU membership, following its 1980 accession, Greece was firmly opposed to any prospect of Turkey’s accession, because of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974), the multiplying Turkish claims against Greek sovereignty and rights over the Aegean, which led the two countries to the brink of war in at least three occasions (the 1976, 1987 and 1996 crises) and the rivalry with Turkey for regional influence in the Balkans.
Overall, and at the risk of oversimplification, EU membership gave Greece a major comparative political advantage that balanced Turkey’s military supremacy, whose clearest manifestation has been the continuing to date, illegal occupation of well over a third of the territory of the State of Cyprus (the Republic of Cyprus) and the permanent maintenance of a massive and heavily armed military force of well over 40.000 troops , enjoying decisive support by the near-by based Turkish air force and reinforced by systemic Turkish colonization of the occupied area of the island.
The repeated Greek blockage of attempts to open the way for Turkey’s EU accession, with continuing Turkish aggression remaining intact was maintained from 1980 to 1999, although a certain policy adjustment took place in March 1995, when Greece lifted a veto on Turkey’s EU Custom Union in exchange for securing a firm timetable for the commencement of Cyprus’ EU accession negotiations in 1998.
As these negotiations were advancing the point of successful completion, in December 1999, at the Helsinki Summit, Greece, without changing in essence its strategy, agreed at the tactical level with Turkey’s candidacy status for EU accession, which included an “enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession”.
Two main political reasons led to this further adjustment of Greek strategy. In the first place, the Greek government realized that the refusal of the European powers to allow Turkey become an E.U. member, was mainly structural in nature, related to strategic concerns. In this context, Athens had no real reason of its own to want to be held responsible by other member states for standing in the way of Turkish membership.
Moreover, secondly, Greece, by agreeing to Turkey’s E.U. accession “candidacy”, secured full and unconditional EU accession for the Republic of Cyprus. Until 1999, the accession of Cyprus, was considered uncertain, not because Cyprus did not satisfy EU accession criteria, but because of the problem of the continuing Turkish occupation of part of the island republic.
In 1999, Greece succeeded in making all its EU partners agree that Cyprus’ EU future would no longer be held hostage of Turkish aggression, especially since successive Cypriot governments, with Greece’s support, were committed to a peaceful UN-led negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, as the only way to terminate the Turkish occupation.
In short, the 1999 adjustment of the policy of Greece vis-à-vis the question of Turkey’s EU accession was determined by realist considerations. Athens acknowledged and accepted a strategic Turkish objective or ambition, EU accession, not as a national retreat but as a means to facilitate its own national policy objectives and future changes in Ankara’s policies, in the context of their harmonization with EU values and principles.
*The opinions stated above are the author's personal opinions
Συνέχεια |
